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Retirement Saving and Decumulation in a Persistent Low-Return Environment 
Abstract 
Recent economic conditions have vastly changed the retirement landscape as a lengthy period of low 
interest rates have made building wealth for retirement harder and the risk of depleting wealth during the 
decumulation phase of retirement greater than at any time in recent history. The retirement environment 
presents challenges, over (i) the period for which interest rate remain low, and (ii) once interest rates 
appreciably increase--as fixed income assets then decrease in value. This paper addresses two related 
topics: first, how have households responded to the current low interest rate environment and second, are 
there alternative responses or investments which households might do well to consider? Beginning with 
the first topic: we employ the HRS to first investigate impacts of the 2008 – 2014 low interest rate 
impacts on savings, wealth and asset allocation both ahead of and while in retirement. As well as 
employing a full sample we report on the responses of the subset of households who have been relatively 
successful at building and preserving wealth over this period. Following this analytic work we consider 
alternative portfolio and wealth management strategies targeting increases in equities and delayed 
participation in Social Security in terms of their potential to add value in persistent low return 
environments. 
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Chapter 9
Retirement Saving and Decumulation in
a Persistent Low-Return Environment
Jason J. Fichtner and Jason S. Seligman
The effects of the 2007–2008 ﬁnancial collapse and related Great Recession
continue to impact the retirement well-being of millions of people. The
Federal Reserve has kept its benchmark short-term interest rate at or near
zero for several years in an effort to stimulate the economy. Although low
interest rates can ﬁnancially beneﬁt those borrowing money to buy a house,
a car, or to fund a new business, such low rates can directly weaken the
ﬁnancial well-being of retirees who are living off their life savings, while also
making it more difﬁcult for pension plans to accumulate assets necessary to
pay future beneﬁts without taking on additional risk by over-investing in stocks.
Low interest rates also translate into lower yields on ﬁxed-income assets,
meaning the interest (coupon) payments that seniors rely on in retirement
will generally be lower than anticipated. This lack of income could lead to
hardship, reduced consumption, and an inability to pay bills. A continued
low interest rate environment affects the value of both deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
and deﬁned contribution (DC) plans. To the extent that the difference
between returns on stocks and bonds (the equity premium) is larger, or
smaller, the low interest rate environment’s impact is more, or less, limited
to ﬁxed-income assets. That has further implications for the impacts of
different asset allocations in a low interest rate environment.
Several other chapters in this volume address how saving and retirement
may be affected in a persistent period of low returns and/or low interest rates.
For example, Blanchett et al. and Wallick et al. discuss optimal retirement
savings in a period of low returns, while Ilmanen and Rauseo consider how to
achieve greater returns and income in a low yield environment. The chapter
by Horneff et al. takes a classic holistic approach to the life cycle planning
problem, and confronts the low interest rate dilemma in that context.
Here we argue some grounds for skepticism that what we observe can be
formalized as an objective ‘strategy.’ This is because so much of what we see
has been a function of asset prices over the 2008–2014 period, and results
will be conditional on initial levels of wealth over this period. And, while
other chapters take a normative frame, addressing what can, or what ought
to be done, this chapter offers a more empirical frame, focusing on what
households have actually done.
Over the low interest rate period we analyze two notable and generally
positive trends. First, high wealth households have beneﬁtted from strong
equity returns. Second, home equity has served in a protective role for lower
wealth households who own homes. But these successes are nuanced, since
the bottom 90 percent of the 2014 wealth distribution experienced large
losses in 2008, and it had not yet recovered by 2014. Moreover, the protect-
ive role of home equity has become limited. In particular, older persons in
the bottom quarter of the wealth distribution, who are on average 18 or
fewer years into retirement, have exhausted all their household wealth.
Of course, all groups took large andmeaningful losses during the ﬁnancial
crisis, but in the low yield environment, those below the 90th percentile have
not recovered, and those below the 25th percentile have consumed all their
wealth. This does not mean that these households have no income: instead,
Social Security income is a very important protective asset for these lower
wealth households. We do not focus on households’ use of Social Security
wealth, because this wealth cannot change very much for individuals who
have already claimed beneﬁts. Yet, we acknowledge that those not yet in
retirement might gain further income protection from delaying claiming
Social Security retirement beneﬁts (Reilly and Byrne in this volume).
While Social Security is an important program for low- and middle-wealth
households, the ﬁnances of Social Security have also been challenged by the
low interest rate environment. Low interest rates negatively impact Social
Security’s broader ﬁnances because Social Security Trust Funds depend in
part on the interest earned on investments in US Treasury bonds. By law,
Social Security must invest any surpluses in Treasury bonds and cannot buy
or hold other ﬁnancial assets such as stocks, mutual funds, or corporate
bonds. Allocation-based strategies for contending with the low interest rate
environment are not thus in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s)
purview.
Revenue generated from interest payments to the Trust Funds has been
declining since 2009 (US Social Security Administration 2016b). Although the
Federal Reserve’s policy of low interest rates is designed to stimulate economic
growth, which is good for employment and wage growth on which the Trust
Fund’s ﬁnancial position also depends, not all growth is equal in terms of its
beneﬁt to the Trust Funds.1 In particular, declines in labor force participation
over much of the recovery mean that there has been less employment and
wage growth on which social security payroll taxes are levied.
Coupled with low interest rates, this lack of payroll tax revenue growth
hastens the depletion of the combined Social Security Trust Funds, cur-
rently projected for 2034. Continued low interest rates, slow economic
growth, and increases in the percentage of the US population in retirement
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all contribute to a quicker depletion of the Social Security Trust Funds. This
threatens the ﬁnancial security of retirees as they face a risk of greater Social
Security beneﬁt cuts much sooner as a result of accelerated Trust Fund
depletion.
One way to help current older workers focuses on delayed claiming
strategies. In fact, we do see some evidence of delayed retirement and
workforce re-entry among recent Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
birth cohorts. For seniors who can delay claiming social security, there is
an opportunity to increase their use of an inﬂation-protected annuity (US
Social Security Administration 2017b). Further, the marginal cost of this
strategy for individuals can be appealing. While private companies that sell
annuities in the private sector generally adjust their payouts and make them
less generous when life spans increase or when interest rates decrease, social
security’s age adjustments are ﬁxed by law. Further, the Delayed Retirement
Credit (DRC) has increased for those reaching age 65 since the turn of the
century, making the returns for this strategy better than they were for most
of the program’s history.2 For someone whose full retirement age is 66, each
year of delayed claiming returns approximately 8 percent. Delaying claim-
ing until age 70 thus results in a 32 percent higher monthly beneﬁt, which
can be appealing.
Further, given the continued trend away from employer-sponsored DB
pensions, individuals are bearing more longevity risk. Longevity risk is
driven by accumulation and allocation risks, as well as by decisions to draw
down assets in retirement. A persistent low-interest rate environment makes
the challenges of saving for retirement and spending in retirement more
difﬁcult, as it is difﬁcult to make up for lost yields.
In what follows, we investigate impacts of the low interest rates over the
2008–2014 period in the HRS on savings, wealth, and asset allocation both
before and in retirement. Following this, we consider alternative portfolio
and wealth management strategies and their potential to add value in a
persistent low return environment. First, however, we review the related
prior literature.
Related Prior Literature
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 resulted in a great and unanticipated
loss of wealth for millions of Americans. The US stock market, measured
by the S&P 500 index, fell 56.7 percent over a little less than a year and a
half.3 Housing prices plummeted and the unemployment rate quickly
rose into the double-digits. General conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system was
shaken. Financial wealth declined by 15 percent for the median household
as a result of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis (Shapiro 2010). These economic
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conditions dramatically changed the retirement landscape for millions of
Americans and likely inﬂuenced retirement behavior as well.
This period was also remarkable for the speed at which the decline in
ﬁnancial markets, housing, and employment occurred, and, according
to the HRS,4 about 28 percent of older households reported that they had
been affected ‘a lot’ by the ﬁnancial crisis, 46 percent responded they
had been affected ‘a little’, and only 26 percent said they were not affected
(Hurd and Rohwedder 2010). Those already in retirement fared better than
those not yet retired (Wells Fargo Securities 2012), suggesting that many
households will face signiﬁcant barriers to reaching their pre-recession
retirement goals and will likely need to save more or work longer than
originally planned.
A sudden and unplanned drop in wealth and income can have signiﬁcant
effects on retirement behavior. Younger or middle-aged workers have more
than a decade before retirement, and so they still have time to recover
ﬁnancial losses. A ﬁnancial shock that includes steep drops in the value of
stock prices, investment portfolios, and housing assets might cause a delay in
retirement plans5 with workers remaining in the workforce longer so as to
rebuild retirement savings (Bosworth and Burtless 2011). Those near or
post-retirement are more limited in their ability to attain or maintain a
secure retirement. For those near retirement, a ﬁnancial crisis might change
the timing of retirement.6 For current retirees, sudden declines in wealth
from housing assets and ﬁnancial portfolios might force immediate changes
in consumption.
The HRS data also provide evidence of the ﬁnancial crisis on the timing of
retirement.7 Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) analyzed respondents who were
working in 2008, and they found that the percentage of workers intending to
work past age 62 increased 3.5 percentage points over the 58.2 percent
proportion reported one year earlier.8 The number of respondents report-
ing that they planned to work past age 65 increased even more: 7.8 percent-
age points above the 38.6 percent who responded they planned to work past
age 65 in 2008 (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010). More recent survey research
has conﬁrmed that more seniors are working after the recession than before
(Wells Fargo Securities 2012). The number of people indicating they plan to
work past the age of 65, or work for some pay in retirement, has also risen
(Coronado 2014).
Taken together, these facts suggest that many are planning on working
longer and retiring later as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis. Hurd and
Rohwedder (2010:11) conclude that ‘the economic crisis has caused house-
holds in and near retirement to suffer sizeable losses in assets. These
households responded in several ways: they reduced spending and as a
result, increased saving, they reported an intent to work longer, and antici-
pate bequeathing less’ (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010: 14). Since the ﬁnancial
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crisis, the annual personal saving rate has also trended upward, from around
1 percent to near 6 percent (Glick and Lansing 2011). All else equal, a
reduction in wealth from a negative ﬁnancial shock appears to have resulted
in workers near retirement increasing income and saving, by remaining in
the workforce longer and reducing consumption.9
Of course, given gains in longevity, working longer may not reduce the
total number of years spent in retirement. According to the Social Security
Administration, a man reaching age 65 today can expect to live to age 84, on
average, while a woman reaching age 65 can expect to live to almost 87 years
old (US Social Security Administration 2017a). People retiring at age 65
should therefore plan to ﬁnancially support themselves for at least 20 years,
based on average longevity. Yet roughly one out of every four people age 65
today will live to age 90, while one out of every ten will live past age 95
(US Social Security Administration 2017a). Longer retirement periods
therefore require more savings. A continued low-interest rate environment
not only exacerbates challenges in saving for retirement during the accu-
mulation phase, but it also greatly increases the risk of outliving retirement
savings during the decumulation phase.
The loss of a job can also affect retirement behavior. As Bosworth and
Burtless (2011: 24) noted, ‘at ages past 60 and especially past 65 . . . reduced
employment levels caused by a weak job market very quickly translate into
reduced labor force participation rates’(Bosworth and Burtless 2011: 14). An
employment shock, such as a sudden loss of a job and a labor market with
high unemployment might hasten the decision on when to retire. The
unemployment rate for workers aged 55 to 64 more than doubled during
the Great Recession (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010a). Also, older
workers who lost their jobs during this period were more likely to have longer
durations of unemployment compared to younger workers. According to
data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 49 percent of unemployed
workers aged 55 or older had been unemployed for 27 weeks or longer,
compared with 28 percent of unemployed workers age 16 to 24, and 41 per-
cent of unemployed workers age 25 to 54 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics
2010b). A Congressional Research Service study found that older workers
who became unemployed have a higher incidence of withdrawing from the
labor market (Congressional Research Service 2007). When they did so, they
replaced earnings with other sources of income such as pensions and social
security beneﬁts. Unemployment among older workers contributes signiﬁ-
cantly to the probability of retirement (Bosworth and Burtless 2011).
Researchers have long recognized the role social security beneﬁts play
in a secure retirement.10 Social security retirement beneﬁts provide income
security for millions of Americans, with 61 percent relying on social security
for 50 percent or more of their income, and 33 percent relying on social
security for 90 percent or more of their income.11 While those with a greater
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dependency on social security income are generally regarded as more
economically vulnerable, the ﬁnancial crisis has affected the income of
these retirees less (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010). Thus, there is less to say
about the impact of low interest rates on this population, as their exposure
to ﬁnancial market assets was limited.
For others, low interest rates are making it more difﬁcult to achieve pre-
set wealth targets. To achieve these targets, people can spend less and save
more now, take on additional risk in the pursuit of higher yielding assets,
work longer, and/or plan to spend less in retirement. None of these options
are without costs, so a persistently low interest rate environment exacerbates
challenges. According to one analysis, the likelihood of exhausting retire-
ment assets increases from 21 percent to 54 percent in an extended period
of low interest rates (Prudential Insurance Company of America 2013). In
fact, our work with HRS data is consistent with the conclusion that the low
interest rate period has contributed to a large increase in the risk of asset
exhaustion.
Though the broad equity and housing markets are now recovering, those
who sold their equity holdings, and who sold, or lost their homes, have not
beneﬁtted from the recovery. While there is conﬂicting evidence on
whether retirees are falling short of adequate resources for retirement, the
preponderance of evidence suggests that future retirees will be less ﬁnan-
cially prepared than in past decades (Fichtner 2014; Munnell et al. 2014).
Effects of the Low Interest Rate Environment
on Saving, Wealth, and Asset Allocation
Our work with the HRS provides additional support for these conclusions.12
The 1992–2014 HRS panel we employ contains self-reports at two-year
intervals, affording the opportunity to examine the wealth of elderly house-
holds, observe allocations across ﬁnancial assets, and look at income. After
offering a descriptive look at the cohort comparisons, we decide how long-
term trends have played out across various age groups ahead of, and
throughout, the low interest rate period. The HRS age groups are obtained
by segmenting the panel into ﬁve-year birth cohorts; those born between
1931 and 1935, 1936 and 1940, and so on, through 1956–1960. While we
include this last birth cohort cluster, its age and relative short duration in the
panel offer less information on savings and asset trajectories. Following this
investigation of cohort dynamics, we then consider differences in experi-
ence across the wealth distribution.
Cohort-Based Descriptive Analyses. A ﬁrst observation is that the value of
bonds held outside of mutual funds has increased over time, but from-and-
to low average levels. Figure 9.1 shows that there appears to be a general
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attenuation of growth in accumulations over the last two to three waves of
HRS data (2010–2014). When viewing this ﬁgure, it is useful to keep in mind
that interest rates were still declining in 2014. Other patterns are consistent
with the idea that the lower interest rates since the Great Recession (i.e., past
the circles marking the 2008 wave data for each cohort-group path) have
continued to mute allocations in this type of investment.
Bonds have historically played a protective role for seniors’ income,
especially absent inﬂation risks. Accordingly, one might posit that risk
sensitivity is an important predictor of bond allocations. Therefore we
construct a four-point Arrow Pratt risk aversion scale from survey responses
in the HRS and look at these groups separately in Figure 9.2 to investigate
this intuition. Results show that 63 percent of the sample falls within the
most risk averse category.
Targeting the least risk-averse 13 percent of the sample, we still ﬁnd lower
reliance on bond portfolios. There are some notable exceptions, however,
especially among the oldest and youngest in our sample. Indeed, bond
portfolios have generally done better than expected over this period as
rates have not only been generally low but also declined over the period
studied. Inﬂation has been quite low as well; thus it is possible that some
among the least risk averse increased their investments in bonds, essentially
making a bet, on appreciation related to declining interest rates (perhaps as
a result of chasing past returns). Yet we are hesitant to make too much of
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Figure 9.1. Value of bonds and bond funds for various cohorts over time
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014. Excludes
bonds held inside mutual funds.
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this because of small sample sizes and low overall reported balances in the
data. Overall, even among the least risk averse, there was evidence of
attenuation in bond accumulations in the period since the Great Recession.
Another historically protective asset has been the home. HRS data include
information on home and mortgage values, allowing us to construct meas-
ures of home equity and the ratio of loan-to-value (LTV). We begin by
charting the evolution of the value of households’ primary residence. As
of 2014, estimated values of primary residences had not fully recovered to
the peak levels reached in 2008, but notably, the general patterns of declines
were relatively uniform. Recent cohorts do not appear to have suffered from
outsized home value depreciation over the period since the Great Reces-
sion. Generally, then, even after the ﬁnancial crisis, homeowners have not
suffered a major decline in this key retirement asset.13 And reassuringly,
homeowners have continued to pay down their mortgages, so the ratio of
home loan to home value, LTV, has generally continued to decline. This
shores up home values that might otherwise be at risk (see Figure 9.3).
In fact, though LTV has generally been higher for the more recent
cohorts, since the youngest HRS cohorts have even accelerated their mort-
gage pay-downs relative to those that came before them. This is seen in the
crossing of cohort-series at the top left of the graph in Figure 9.4. This could
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Figure 9.2. Value of bonds and bond funds for various cohorts over time in 2015
US dollars: those reporting as least risk averse via Arrow-Pratt measure HRS data
1992–2014
Source : Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014. Excludes
bonds held inside mutual funds.
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Figure 9.3. Value of primary residence for various cohorts over time in 2015 US
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Source : Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Figure 9.4. Loan to value: primary residence for various cohorts over time, HRS
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be the result of the stricter rules governing mortgage issuance which would
tend to reduce reﬁnancing and home-equity-based lines of credit. Yet,
rather than being lender driven (and thus based on the supply of credit),
the decline could also be demand driven. That is, borrowers might be more
reluctant to borrow as much in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Finally,
the pattern could be due to relative prices and opportunity costs—an impact
of the low interest rate environment. For example, lower interest rates
generate lower interest payments, reducing the realized value of mortgage
interest deductions for tax purposes. It is certainly possible that each of
these three factors plays a role in explaining the data.
Another real-estate-related asset category, ‘other property,’ might argu-
ably be of value to aging households in a low interest rate environment,
because (1) although these properties require ongoing maintenance, such
holdings can pay a stream of rental income; and further because (2) they
may appreciate in value. In fact, Figures 9.5 and 9.6 show a notable break in
the real estate holding habits of cohorts based on risk preferences. For the
most risk averse, one observes increasing holdings, even following the Great
Recession (Figure 9.5). Yet for the least risk averse, accumulation patterns
generally ﬂatten or decline from the peak in 2008 (Figure 9.6). The
mountain-like proﬁle representing holdings for the 1951–55 cohort is dis-
tinct and perhaps has to do with more speculative real estate activity before
and after the US housing bubble burst in 2007–2008 among these birth
cohorts.14
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Figure 9.5. Net value of other real estate for various cohorts over time in 2015 US
dollars: those reporting as most risk averse via Arrow-Pratt HRS data 1992–2014
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Moving from consideration of assets that pay a stream of income or
services (i.e. bonds, homes and rental properties) we next look at trends
in income. Here the evidence suggests that younger cohorts are earning
higher incomes for longer, but there is no general evidence of a compen-
sating increase in income following the asset markdowns during in the Great
Recession. That is, older households do not appear to have delayed exit or
re-entered the labor market to any marked degree. (See Figure 9.7).
Interestingly, the general patterns for income tapering across cohorts are
consistent with the evolution of mortgages illustrated in Figure 9.5. Younger
cohorts have more income and hold higher mortgage balances at similar
ages. A look at more liquid assets and short-term debt shows that cohorts
have behaved very similarly over time. As a rule, they all generally hold liquid
balances between $10,000 and $20,000 and manage their ﬁnances such that
other debt tapers to the $4,000–$6,000 range by age 62–63.
In sum, focusing on balances for traditional retirement investments pro-
vides mixed results in terms of risk-return characteristics and both cash and
asset management strategies. Observed patterns suggest delayed income
tapering may be aligned with delayed mortgage payoff, and that investments
in bonds may be muted in the low interest rate environment since the Great
Recession. By comparison, the value of stocks (equity and mutual fund
holdings) has grown for most cohorts following the negative shocks related
to the ﬁnancial crisis (Figure 9.8).
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Figure 9.6. Net value of other real estate for various cohorts over time in 2015 US
dollars: those reporting as least risk averse via Arrow-Pratt HRS data 1992–2014
Source : Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Figure 9.7. Earnings for various cohorts over time in 2015 US dollars, HRS data
1992–2014
Source : Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Figure 9.8. Net value of equities and mutual fund holdings for various cohorts over
time in 2015 US dollars, HRS data 1992–2014
Source : Authors’ calculation from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Wealth Experiences Through Retirement
So far, we have characterized the wealth and asset allocations of cohorts
without considering whether members are retired, but we can also consider
asset evolutions conditional on retirement. People self-report retirement in
the HRS, and next we use these reports to tag households’ evolution from
this event forward. To this end we differentiate households by their place in
the overall wealth distribution in 2014.
Again we compare cohorts based on where they were in 2008 to compare
the evolution of wealth pre- and post-recession. Looking ﬁrst at total wealth,
we see that the Great Recession imposed a notable shock on assets across
every wealth group: none were spared. Patterns during the recovery are
quite different, however. The bottom 10 percent of households lost more
than half their wealth between 2008 and 2010, and had not yet recovered as
of 2014. In fact, on average they depleted their wealth around 16 years into
retirement. Focusing on the bottom quartile of the 2014 wealth distribution,
it too depleted its assets within about 18 years of retirement (see Figure 9.9).
This is notable inasmuch as it is less than the 20-or-so years that ﬁnancial
advisors might use for longevity. By 18 years into retirement, the bottom
50 percent of all HRS households averaged only about $50,000 in net
ﬁnancial assets, and the 75th percentile of the distribution had just over
twice that amount.15
0
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Figure 9.9. Average total assets in 2015 US dollars before and after retirement
Source: Authors’ calculation from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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By contrast, the top 10 percent, who generally were older and had been
retired longer at the time of the Great Recession, saw strong increases in
their total assets, more than recovering their losses. Figure 9.10 makes it
clear that the wealthiest 10 percent started with more assets before the Great
Recession, but that does not explain why total wealth for this group grew
afterwards. Speciﬁcally, this subgroup held higher allocations to stock and
mutual funds, and it has increased its proportional allocations over time
(see Figure 9.11). The same is true for allocations to bonds, though the
proportions of these allocations are lower (Figure 9.12).16
One asset class where groups behaved more uniformly is with respect to
allocations to very short-term debt investments, where all groups reduced
allocations since the Great Recession. In 2008, these comprised from 1 to
4.4 percent of ﬁnancial wealth, but since 2008, all groups curtailed their
holdings between 1.2 and 2.4 percentage points.
There is also an interesting bit of evidence on liquidity, as seen in
Figure 9.13. Early in our data, liquid asset positions were relatively uniform.
But as groups moved toward 2014, cash increasingly made up a greater
proportion of assets for those lower in the wealth distribution, until there
was a collapse (correlated with insolvency).
While the cause of this trend remains unclear, there are two hypotheses
worth considering. First, the increase in cash can be related to expenses
rising relative to assets. Second, insolvency may in part be driven by
–100,000
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Figure 9.10. Average total assets before and after retirement in 2015 US dollars: for
HRS households with a retired person
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Figure 9.11. Proportion of stocks to total assets for HRS households with a retired
person
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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Figure 9.12. Proportion of bonds to total assets for HRS households with a retired
person (excludes bonds held through mutual funds)
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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preferences to hold non-performing assets such as homes. Increases in
liquid asset positions among the lower half of the 2014 wealth distribution
emerged well ahead of the Great Recession, in support of the second
hypothesis.
Moving to home values, conditional on owning a home, the lowest 25 per-
cent of the asset distribution in 2014 appear to have relied on home equity
to ﬁnance their retirement, to various degrees. For the bottom 10 percent of
the wealth distribution, home equity drawdowns were nearly complete, as
seen in Figure 9.14. This also conﬁrms some degree of allocative response to
changes in interest rates.
Multivariate Regression Analysis and Results
Next we employ the HRS data in order to explore potential factors contrib-
uting to total asset positions, controlling for household characteristics. We
use multivariate regression and investigate bond and liquid allocations, in
keeping with the idea that these assets, generally thought of as safe for
elders, will be vulnerable in a low interest rate environment.
Our dataset includes household-level information that helps us to control
for many important factors driving wealth and portfolio allocations. (See
Table 9A.1, in the Appendix). To account for differential householdmortality
–20%
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Figure 9.13. Proportion of liquid to total assets for HRS households with a retired
person
Source: Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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and associated changes in household size, we include both household mem-
bers separately, and we control on marital status, sex, and a marriage-gender
interaction term. We use panel regressions for work and Tobit regressions for
proportions or ratios.
Variables of interest. We target two types of dependent variables, the ﬁrst
being measures of total household wealth, and the second being measures
of portfolio allocation. Household wealth is skewed, especially in the after-
math of the Great Recession, as we observed above. In regressions with the
full sample, we employ two binary variables targeting the top and bottom
10 percent of the wealth distribution. We also run panel data Tobit regres-
sions on portfolio allocations and on the home LTV dependent variable.
The explanatory variable of main interest is the low interest rate indicator,
coded to equal 1 for all interviews following December 2008, which was the
month the Federal Reserve dropped the Federal Funds Rate to a target
range of 0–25 basis points. Because this key rate drives global interest rates
for ﬁxed income products, and because it stayed in the same near-zero
target window well past the last 2014 interview date, this binary variable
captures the low interest rate environment rather parsimoniously.
We also control on whether the respondent was retired and the number
of years retired, tagging retirement as of the ﬁrst interview announcement.
The number of years retired is measured as the difference from retirement
year and the interview date. Age and the square of age use the oldest living
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Figure 9.14. Loan to value for primary residence for HRS households with retired
person
Source : Authors’ calculations from RAND HRS Version P panel data 1992–2014.
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spouse (in married households). Household education is similarly reported
from the maximum education status using the HRS 5-point scale. As an
additional measure for education, we calculate any spousal difference in
household educational attainment. This education-spread in the household
attenuates the return to the education variable. We also control for risk
tolerance, employing a scaled Arrow Pratt measure derived in the RAND
HRS dataset.
Finally, we include household level controls for race and ethnicity, marital
status, sex, and cohort indicators, as well as whether they are in the top or
bottom 10 percent of the wealth distribution.
Results. We ﬁrst ran panel regressions to determine the impact of the low
interest rate era on households’ total asset position. In the sample of roughly
10,400 households, people experienced an average wealth shock of
$84,000–$85,000 over the low interest period of 2009–2014. We note that
this is controlling for retirement, labor force participation (ahead of and
after initial retirement, and including part-time work), employer retirement
plan, social security program participation, race, sex, marital status, age,
cohort, and being in the top or bottom 10 percent of the wealth distribution.
Our results are quite stable both in terms of economic and statistical signiﬁ-
cance (details appear in Table 9A.2). Additionally, among the lower portion
of the wealth distribution, we found that the low interest rate period was
again associated with very large declines in wealth.
Therefore, of course, protective factors that can be identiﬁed, for
instance, the married and the better educated fared better. It also appears
that some households re-engaged in market work when confronted with
lower asset balances, as labor force participation is correlated with lower
asset balances. This relationship ﬂips, however, in the lowest 25 percent of
the distribution (see Table 9A.3). We suspect that this has to do with a
general paucity of assets for retirees in this group.
Turning to bond allocations, using the panel Tobit estimator, we observe
estimated declines of roughly 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points for bond alloca-
tions during the low interest rate period. This represents a fairly large
attenuation effect given the low proportions of bonds reported above. The
attenuation is much larger for the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution,
where bond holdings were greater earlier in retirement. These ﬁndings
survive several robustness checks, remaining statistically signiﬁcant at or
above the 5 percent conﬁdence level (see Table 9A.4).
We next explore how stock and mutual fund allocations evolved in the
panel Tobit framework. Again, the low interest rate period was associated
with declines in equity and mutual fund allocations of 1.4–1.5 percentage
points, but for the top and bottom 10 percent of the wealth distribution,
effects differed. The bottom 10 percent allocated away from this asset class,
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by roughly an additional percentage point, while the top 10 percent
increased its allocation by roughly 9 percentage points (see Table 9A.5).
Finally, we examine home LTV dynamics, where the estimates imply
interest rate environment is a 2 percentage point increase in LTV. Again,
however, the experiences of the top and bottom 10 percent were quite
different. For the lowest 10 percent of the wealth distribution, there was a
much larger 27 percentage point increase in LTV, while the LTV declined
11 percentage points among the top 10 percent. Thus, a 38 percentage
point difference in the evolution of LTVs across these groups should
give pause as to the ﬁnancial security and overall stability of less well-off
retirees, including the more fortunate among those who own homes
(see Table 9A.6).
Conclusions
The Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the subsequent low interest rate
environment deepened the challenges facing older Americans as they man-
age assets into and through retirement. Our analyses of traditional retire-
ment holding yielded mixed results. For instance, most households took
signiﬁcant losses from which they have not fully recovered, yet results are
heterogeneous. The wealthiest 10 percent saw marked improvements in its
wealth since the Great Recession but around a quarter of retired households
reported negative net asset positions by 2014. Those in the bottom quartile
who own homes have extracted equity from their homes to ﬁnance their
retirement.
While ﬁnancial security in retirement may still be feasible, it surely will
become challenging. Many will need to save more on their own and work
longer, either retiring later or working part time in retirement. Additionally,
older persons will need to consider the merits of delaying when they claim
Social Security retirement beneﬁts, to maximize the inﬂation-protected
annuity this will produce.
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Notes
1. It is possible that the low interest rate environment will be around for a shorter
period than some have projected.
2. For example, while the annual rate of increase for those born in 1933 or 1934 is
5.5 percent, for those born ten or more years later, the DRC is 8 percent per year.
3. The S&P 500 index value at market close on October 10, 2007 was 1562.47, and
on March 9, 2009 it was 676.53. The National Bureau of Economic Research, the
arbiter of the start and end dates of a recession, determined that the recession
that began in December 2007 ended in June 2009, roughly coinciding with the
peak and trough dates of the S&P 500 index.
4. The HRS is a longitudinal survey of health, retirement, and aging that has been
conducted every two years since 1992 and interviews more than 22,000 Ameri-
cans over the age of 50.
5. In this context, ‘retirement plans’ refer to peoples’ goals, strategies and behav-
iors, not to DC or DB retirement plans.
6. The timing of retirement can be affected by more than age, including accumu-
lated savings, the availability of an employer-provided pension, the willingness or
ability to continue working part-time in retirement, personal health, access to
health coverage, and general economic conditions.
7. The authors used data from the 2006 and 2008 core surveys, as well as data from
two supplemental surveys, the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS)
and the HRS Internet Study. Although the time between the 2008 HRS interview
and a subsequent 2009 HRS Internet survey was insufﬁcient to observe actual
behavior, the data nonetheless can be used to shed light on retirement expect-
ations (Hurd et al. 2005).
8. What is described here are the expectations of working past either age 62 or age
65. Hurd et al. (2005) have found that these retirement expectations are pre-
dictive of actual retirement.
9. For a theoretical model of this behavior see Chai et al. (2012).
10. For a summary of research work on this area see Burkhauser et al. (2009).
11. These percentages are reported for aged units receiving beneﬁts. An aged unit is
deﬁned by the Social Security Administration as ‘a married couple living
together or a nonmarried person, which also includes persons who are separated
or married but not living together.’ All ﬁgures in this sentence reported from:
US Social Security Administration (2016a).
12. RAND version P include HRS data through the 2014 wave, all ﬁgures adjusted to
2015 dollars (Health and Retirement Study 2006).
13. This is consistent with Federal Reserve G20 Financial Accounts of US data, which
show that as of Q3 2016 household owners’ equity in real estate was 96.8 percent
of the pre-recession peak, from Q1, 2006. Two years earlier, in Q3 2014 the
recovery in these data was 77.9 percent—much less complete (Glick and Lansing
2011).
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14. This cohort’s wealth may evolve in ways that are interesting to other researchers
in the future.
15. When considering these asset numbers recall that, as well as assets, the vast
majority of those we are looking at here receive Social Security income. Asset
depletion thus does not necessarily mean that 10–25 percent of households do
not have resources on which to rely.
16. Because bonds can be held in mutual funds, we reason that the HRS data
represent an under-reporting of bonds and over-reporting of equities, as a
proportion of overall portfolios.
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